Suchergebnisse

This is not the first time Washington launched a major diplomatic initiative in Africa in a ham-handed manner. The United States failed to adequately brief or consult these audiences prior to unveiling a multiyear capacity building effort to develop African peacekeeping capabilities. The change from ACFR to ACRI was more than just cosmetic. The idea of supporting a standing force was replaced with enhancing African willingness and abilities. This was more acceptable, though arguable no more efficacious. African official are hospitable and pragmatic. Initial skepticism and distrust can be overcome as occurred with ACRF. The United States should explain why AFRICOM serves African interests. It does so in two important easy that the author fail to address. First, AFRICOM gives the continent a much stronger voice within the US government to advocate African interests. Second, coordination within the US department of defense on African matters should be greatly enhanced to the benefit of Africans. In short, there is no dearth of challenges facing Africans and policymakers on the continent and abroad charged with promoting peace and resolving armed conflict. AFRICOM should be part of the solution. The decision making behind Secretary of Defense Remsfeld's announcement seemed to be harried and the interim period before the Command became operational was rather short. But the idea for an Africa Command had been discussed at various levels within the US department of defense for more than a decade. AFRICOM is a natural progression or evolution in American military thought and is long overdue. It is not a new militaristic approach to Africa. AFRICOM's initial missteps should be taking in stride. Adapted from the source document.

The land mines treaty of 1997 and the recent agreement to get rid of cluster munitions have outlawed whole categories of weapons. Small arms present an equally dangerous, but much more complex, problem. The United Nations will target it again this month. Adapted from the source document.

Western capacity-building programs designed to support African peacekeeping efforts have focused on classroom instruction, field training, and the provision of military equipment. These policies are significant given the numerous threats to peace and security throughout the continent and given the United Nations Security Council's continued reliance on African regional organizations and arrangements in the event of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. Initially, only France's program included the provision of small arms and light weapons, and then on a rather limited scale. Subsequently, the United States and the United Kingdom have developed programs that have provided substantial quantities of lethal materiel. This article documents what has been provided and to whom. It reviews the oversight mechanisms used to ensure that equipment is used as intended, and asks whether the programs have served to promote peace and security as intended. The article argues that, while it is too early to determine the effectiveness of these programs, the checks and balances created to ensure that training and weapons are used as intended should be strengthened.

The author served as the political affairs officer of the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry (ICOI) during its most recent tour (May through November 1998). (The political affairs officer is not responsible for the investigation's findings, which were the responsibility of the commission's chairman and members.) The author argues that to understand the work and findings of the commission, one must first place it within the broader context of the UN Security Council's failure to respond appropriately to the genocide in Rwanda. He concludes that despite appearances to the contrary, there was little enthusiasm to see ICOI succeed in fulfilling its mandate. The commission is another example of the unwillingness of the United Nations and the international community to take meaningful action toward Rwanda specifically and the Great Lakes region generally.